U hq,@sddlZddlZddlZddlmZddlmZddlmZddl m Z m Z ddl m Z ddlmZdd lmZdd lmZdd lmZdd lmZmZd ZdZdZdZGdddeZGdddZdS)N)sha256)deque)AES) SecurityErrorInvalidBufferError) BinaryReader) TLMessage) TLRequest)InvokeAfterMsgRequest) GzipPacked) BadServerSaltBadMsgNotificationii, c@s&eZdZdZedddZddZdS)_OpaqueRequestzN Wraps a serialized request into a type that can be serialized again. datacCs ||_dSNr)selfrrA/tmp/pip-unpacked-wheel-c81u5j2r/telethon/network/mtprotostate.py__init__sz_OpaqueRequest.__init__cCs|jSrrrrrr_bytes"sz_OpaqueRequest._bytesN)__name__ __module__ __qualname____doc__bytesrrrrrrrsrc@sreZdZdZddZddZddZedd Zd d d d Z ddZ ddZ ddZ ddZ ddZddZd S) MTProtoStatea  `telethon.network.mtprotosender.MTProtoSender` needs to hold a state in order to be able to encrypt and decrypt incoming/outgoing messages, as well as generating the message IDs. Instances of this class hold together all the required information. It doesn't make sense to use `telethon.sessions.abstract.Session` for the sender because the sender should *not* be concerned about storing this information to disk, as one may create as many senders as they desire to any other data center, or some CDN. Using the same session for all these is not a good idea as each need their own authkey, and the concept of "copying" sessions with the unnecessary entities or updates state for these connections doesn't make sense. While it would be possible to have a `MTProtoPlainState` that does no encryption so that it was usable through the `MTProtoLayer` and thus avoid the need for a `MTProtoPlainSender`, the `MTProtoLayer` is more focused to efficiency and this state is also more advanced (since it supports gzipping and invoking after other message IDs). There are too many methods that would be needed to make it convenient to use for the authentication process, at which point the `MTProtoPlainSender` is better. cCsR||_|t|_d|_d|_d|_|_|_tt d|_ d|_ d|_ | dS)Nr)maxlen)auth_keyr_log time_offsetsaltid _sequence _last_msg_idrMAX_RECENT_MSG_IDS_recent_remote_ids_highest_remote_id _ignore_countreset)rr"loggersrrrr>s  zMTProtoState.__init__cCs>tdtdd|_d|_d|_|jd|_ d|_ dS)z# Resets the state. qrN) structunpackosurandomr&r'r(r*clearr+r,rrrrr-Js  zMTProtoState.resetcCs||_dS)za Updates the message ID to a new one, used when the time offset changed. N)_get_new_msg_idmsg_id)rmessagerrrupdate_message_idVszMTProtoState.update_message_idcCs|rdnd}t||||d}t||d|d|}|dd|dd|dd}|dd|dd|dd}||fS) z Calculate the key based on Telegram guidelines for MTProto 2, specifying whether it's the client or not. See https://core.telegram.org/mtproto/description#defining-aes-key-and-initialization-vector rr0$(LN )rdigest)r"msg_keyclientxZsha256aZsha256baes_keyaes_ivrrr _calc_key]s   $$zMTProtoState._calc_keyN)after_idc Csj|}||}|dkr(t||}nt|tt|t|}|t d||t ||||S)zj Writes a message containing the given data into buffer. Returns the message id. NzzIServer sent a very old message with ID %d, ignoring (see FAQ for details)zIServer sent a very new message with ID %d, ignoring (see FAQ for details))"timerJrr1r2r"rUrrErTrZ decrypt_igerr?rZ read_longr&r+r*r#warning_count_ignoredZread_intZ tgread_objectZCONSTRUCTOR_IDr rr$update_time_offsetMSG_TOO_OLD_DELTAMSG_TOO_NEW_DELTAappendr,r )rrMnowrUr@rCrDZour_keyreaderZ remote_msg_idZremote_sequenceobjZremote_msg_timeZ time_deltarrrdecrypt_message_datasZ        z!MTProtoState.decrypt_message_datacCs$|jd7_|jtkr tddS)NrZz1Too many messages had to be ignored consecutively)r,MAX_CONSECUTIVE_IGNOREDrrrrrr]s zMTProtoState._count_ignoredcCsTt|j}t|t|d}t|d>|d>B}|j|krJ|jd}||_|S)z Generates a new unique message ID based on the current time (in ms) since epoch, applying a known time offset. geAr>r)r[r$intr()rrbZ nanosecondsZ new_msg_idrrrr6s  zMTProtoState._get_new_msg_idcCsX|}|j}tt}|d?}|||_|j|krRd|_|jd||||j|jS)zd Updates the time offset to the correct one given a known valid message ID. r>rzs$